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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
made that this will happen. The physical limitations that the
Court will place on premises is also indefinite. It is, however,
doubtful that the Court would consider an apartment house or
an entire office building as a premise subject to search in con-
nection with a valid arrest. But it appears safe to say that any
premise that can be said to be under the immediate control of
the defendant is subject to a search and seizure as an incident
of a lawful arrest.
The decision in United States v. Rabinowitz brings a degree
of certainty to this phase of the law that has been lacking since
the pre-Davis days. This is true in spite of the fact that the
Rabinowitz case was a 5-3 decision and that Justice Douglas,
who in light of his past record would more than likely have
voted with the minority, was absent.
During the period that lapsed between the three cases of
Johnson, Trupiano, and McDonald and the case of the United
States v. Rabinowitz, Justices Murphy and Rutledge, who voted
with the majority in those cases, died and were replaced by
Justices Clark and Minton,32 who sided in the Rabinowitz case
with the minority in the above mentioned cases to form a new
majority. In reality, the Rabinowitz case can be considered a
6-3 decision when it is realized that Justice Black's dissent in
that case was not in protest against the extension of the right
to search concurrent with a valid arrest but was motivated by
a desire for certainty, which he felt could be obtained by adher-
ing to the Trupiano rule long enough to see how it worked.3 3
When that is taken in conjunction with his view as expressed by
the Davis and Harris cases, it is not mere conjecture to assume
that if the situation is again presented, Justice Black will side
with the present majority.
A. W. MACY
TORTS-LIABILITY OF OWNER OF STOLEN AUTOMOBILE-A car
owner left his car unattended and unlocked on a public street,
with the key in the ignition. The car was stolen, and in the
getaway the thief negligently drove into and injured plaintiff,
who was exercising reasonable care. Financially responsible car
32. It is interesting to note that both Justice Clark and Justice Minton,
who have long been associated with "New Deal" and "Fair Deal" Civil
Rights programs in other civil liberties questions, sided with the govern-
ment and against civil liberties in this case.
33. Justice Black, dissenting in United States v. Rabinowitz, 70 S.Ct. 430,
445, 94 L.Ed. 407, 414.
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thieves being rather scarce, the plaintiff sued the owner of the
automobile for damages. Plaintiff was awarded judgment. Oster-
gard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N.E. (2d) 537 (1948).
This case has perhaps been the subject of more notes and
comments than any other case in recent tort history. Interest
has centered mainly on the aspect of proximate cause and fore-
seeable risk. In the writer's opinion, another facet of the case
also presents interesting possibilities. It is suggested that the
decision in Ostergard v. Frisch represents a further extension of
tort liability of automobile owners, by including thieves within
the class of third persons for whose negligent driving the owner
is liable.
The rules defining the liability of an automobile owner for
injuries resulting from the negligent operation of his automobile
were formulated to a large extent in the years immediately fol-
lowing its invention. These rules consisted mainly of applica-
tions of the well-settled common law doctrines of personal fault
and agency. During this period the number of automobiles was
small and their rate of speed slow, due both to their early stage
of development and the poor quality of highways. Therefore
attendant risks were not so numerous nor of such degree as to
prevent the courts from dispensing adequate justice under such
rules.
As better highway systems and faster automobiles were de-
veloped, the situation rapidly changed. The number and uses of
automobiles greatly increased, and along with all this came a
corresponding increase in the risks connected with their use.
One of the risks which gained in significance was that of
injury through the negligent operation of an automobile by some
person other than its owner. The plaintiff's only recourse in
such cases was against the driver, unless he could show an ortho-
dox agency relationship between the driver and the owner, or
unless the owner was personally at fault. If these non-owner
drivers had been as a general rule financially solvent, the chang-
ing situation would not have greatly affected a plaintiff's chance
of recovery. As a matter of fact, insolvency was the general rule,
so much so that under the restrictive doctrines that existed the
courts witnessed an increasing "crop" of empty judgments for
injured plaintiffs. Feeling that as between an injured plaintiff
who usually could ill afford to shoulder the risk and the car
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owner who could adequately protect himself through insurance'
the latter should bear the burden, many courts sought to extend
the car owner's liability to cover injuries resulting from the
negligent operation of his automobile by other persons.
Personal faultdoes not easily lend itself to judicial extension
and courts generally confine its application. If the owner has
allowed a driver to operate a defective automobile when the
owner knew or should have known of the defect, he can be found
personally at fault.2 Also under the concept of personal fault,
and long established in the common law as applicable to other
vehicles, is the rule making the owner of an automobile liable
for injuries caused by the meddling of children and other non-
culpables when he knew, or should have known, that such med-
dling was likely under the circumstances of the case.3
Agency doctrines provided the courts with a somewhat more
plastic tool with which to shape owner liability. The agent could
be sued for his own negligence, but more often than not he was
financially irresponsible, and the courts were quick to apply
the doctrine of respondeat superior to automobile cases in order
to reach the solvent automobile owner. Where the servant is
authorized to drive his master's automobile and allows a third
party to drive without the master's knowledge, some courts
hold the owner liable for the negligence of the third party if
the servant is present in the automobile.4 Even if the ser-
vant and the third party wilfully disobey the owner's command
not to let the third party drive the automobile, the owner has
still been held liable if the automobile was being used within
the scope of the servant's employment at the time of the acci-
dent.5 But in the case of Lanauze v. Baldwin Company6 the Lou-
1. The ordinary automobile liability insurance protects the owner from
claims of persons injured by a driver operating the car with the owner's
express or implied permission. It would seem that for slightly higher prem-
iums the owner could acquire protection against any claim resulting from
the operation of his automobile by anyone. Ins. L. J. 519, 521 (June, 1947).
See Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium (1932) 32 Col. L.
Rev. 785, for an excellent discussion of this problem.
2. Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777, 176 S.E. 540 (1934); Coker v.
Moose, 180 Okla. 234, 68 P.(2d) 504 (1937). For cases where the owner's
negligence lay in knowingly allowing a person under the statutory age to
drive, see Roark v. Stone, 224 Mo. App. 554, 30 S.W.(2d) 647 (1930); Wery v.
Seff, 136 Ohio 307, 25 N.E.(2d) 692 (1940); Laubach v. Colley, 283 Pa. 366,
129 Atl. 88 (1925).
3. Spanko v. Spitalnick, 101 N.J. Law 5, 127 Atl. 663 (1925); Barbanes v.
Brown, 110 N.J. Law 6, 163 Atl. 148 (1932).
4. Geiss v. Twin City Taxicab Co., 120 Minn. 368, 139 N.W. 611 (1913);
Slothower v. Clark, 191 Mo. App. 105, 179 S.W. 55 (1915).
5. Emison v. Wylam Ice Cream Co., 215 Ala. 504, 111 So. 216 (1927).
6. 2 La. App. 345 (1925).
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isiana court of appeal made it clear that it was not willing to
hold the owner liable where his agent allows a third party to
drive, in the absence of a showing that the agent permitted an
incompetent person to drive. It intimated that the owner would
be liable in the latter case.
Using agency theory as a basis, a number of jurisdictions
have extended its principles so as to hold the owner liable for
negligent operation of his automobile by members of his fam-
ily.7 The "family purpose" doctrine was well stated in King v.
Smythe:8 "If an instrumentality of this kind is placed in the
hands of his family by a father for the family pleasure, con-
venience, and entertainment, the dictates of mere justice should
require that the owner be responsible for its negligent opera-
tion." The family purpose doctrine marks the farthest exten-
sion, with one exception, of owner liability predicated upon the
common law rules of personal fault or agency. That exception
is the "dangerous instrumentality" doctrine.
Statutes have further extended the owner's liability for
the negligent operation of his automobile by others. Some states
have statutes which extend the owner's liability by holding him
liable for all deaths or injuries to persons or property resulting
from the negligent operation of his automobile by any person
using the automobile with his consent. These statutes are ex-
pressions of legislative policy, imposing liability without fault
on the owner. Under such statutes, if the owner lends his me-
chanically perfect automobile to a thoroughly competent driver,
he is still liable for the negligent operation of his automobile by
7. About half the states have adopted the "family purpose" doctrine.
For a grouping of the states which have, and which do not have this doc-
trine, see (1929) 64 A.L.R. 844, (1936) 100 A.L.R. 1021, and (1928) 26 Mich.
L. Rev. 846, 848. That the person liable is not always the father, but rather
the solvent car owner, see Smith v. Overstreet Adm'r, 258 Ky. 781, 81 S.W.
(2d) 571 (1935), where recovery was allowed against a mother, not the head
of the family, who allowed the family use of her car. That the family in-
cludes not only blood relationship but also those who come closely in con-
tact with it, such as housekeepers, see Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447,
138 AtI. 365 (1927). That the family purpose doctrine applies only to auto-
mobiles, see Felcyn v. Gamble, 185 Minn. 357, 241 N.W. 37, 79 A.L.R. 1159
(1932).
8. 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 296 (1918).
9. 140 Tenn. 217, 226, 204 S.W. 296, 298 (1918). Even in jurisdictions
which do not have the "family purpose" doctrine, the tendency appears to
be to stretch the principles of agency as far as possible. A child going after
his own pair of shoes was held to be his father's agent in Graham v. Page,
300 Ill. 40, 132 N.E. 817 (1921), as was a boy driving his younger brother .to
school, in Gray v. Meadows, 24 Ala. App. 487, 136 So. 876 (1931).
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that driver. 10 Typical of these is that of New York: ' "Negligence
of operator other than owner attributable to owner. Every
owner of a motor vehicle . . .operated upon a public highway
shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person
or property resulting from negligence in the operation of such
motor vehicle . . .by any person legally using or operating the
same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.' 12
A few states have reached comparable results by legislation,
although not having a statute of this type. South Carolina 3 and
Tennessee1 4 for instance, each have a statute which makes the
car itself liable up to its value at a sheriff's sale for all accidents
caused by its negligent operation on the public highways of the
state. Florida is the only jurisdiction which has reached this
point in owner liability by way of common law. In Southern
Cotton Oil Company v. Anderson" an automobile owner was
held liable for the negligent operation of his car by an unauthor-
ized third person on the ground that an automobile is a danger-
ous instrumentality when operated on the public highways.'6
In the instant case, the plaintiff relied upon an Illinois stat-
ute which makes it unlawful for a person driving, or in charge
of a motor vehicle to leave it unattended, without first stopping
it, locking the ignition and removing the key.17 The statute in
itself does not hold the automobile owner liable for the negli-
gent driving of a thief, yet the court held that the defendant's
violation of the statute was the "proximate cause" of plaintiff's in-
juries. The Illinois court was called upon to interpret the statute.
Considerations of public policy are always present whenever a
court indulges in statutory interpretation. It is submitted that
the impulses discussed in the opening paragraphs were the mo-
10. New York Consol. Laws, c. 25, § 282-e; Thompson's Laws of New
York (1939) 912-Vehicle and Traffic § 59.
11. For a summary of states having a statute similar to that of New
York, see (1926) 42 A.L.R. 898, (1931) 74 A.L.R. 951, (1935) 96 A.L.R. 634.
12. Atkins v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, 261 N.Y. 352, 185 N.E. 408 (1933);
Young v. Masci, 109 N.J. Law 453, 162 Atl. 623, 83 A.L.R. 869 (1932).
13. S.C. Code (Supp. 1942) § 8792.
14. Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) § 2682.
15. 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629, 16 A.L.R. 255 (1920).
16. There appeared to be a tendency in several subsequent cases to
rely upon a statute requiring the licensing of automobiles by taking the
view that a person driving an automobile did so under the authority of
the owner's license and hence was the owner's agent. Herr v. Butler, 101
Fla. 1125, 132 So. 815 (1931); Green v. Miller, 102 Fla. 767, 136 So. 532 (1931).
But the latest Florida case in point expressly reaffirms the rationale of
Southern Cotton Oil v. Anderson, Lynch & Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.(2d)
268 (1947).
17. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937) c. 95%, § 189.
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tivating factors behind the court's decision, and that, disposed
toward placing the liability on the owner of the automobile, it
seized upon the statute as a convenient "peg" upon which to
hang its decision. Having found the owner to be guilty of an
unlawful act in leaving his car unlocked and with the keys in
the ignition, the court was willing to extend his liability result-
ing from the unlawful act to include injuries resulting from the
negligent driving of the thief. To use the language of modern
tort analysis, the Illinois court decided that the statute which
required defendant to remove the keys and lock the automobile
was designed to include plaintiff's interest in personal safety
within its protective ambit, and also that the statute was de-
signed to protect this interest from the risk of injury through
the negligent operation of the motor vehicle by a thief.
Other states have statutes similar to that of Illinois. Massa-
chusetts, for example, has an identical statute, and in one case,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court" interpreted it so
as to hold the owner liable under facts very similar to those in
the present case. In a later decision,19 however, this case was
expressly overruled, and today Massachusetts follows the general
rule that the owner of an automobile is not liable for the negli-
gent driving of a thief. As mentioned earlier, the owner has long
been held liable for injuries resulting from the meddling of
children or other non-culpables, but the precedent established
in Ostergard v. Frisch is seen as the inclusion of a new class of
unauthorized third persons, namely, thieves, for the negligence
of whom the owner of the car can be held liable. At the present
time only one other jurisdiction can be said to have committed
itself to the rule established in Ostergard v. Frisch. The federal
district court of Washington, D. C., favored this extension of
owner liability in the recent case of Ross v. Hartman.20 The
Supreme Court of Minnesota has also given some indication that
it might follow the Ostergard v. Frisch decision in a proper case.
In the case of Wannebo v. Gates,21 the Minnesota court refused
to hold the owner liable, on the ground that the injury caused
by the thief's negligence did not occur during the flight but at
a later time. The Court thus distinguished the case from that
of Ostergard v. Frisch.
18. Malloy v. Newman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N.E.(2d) 1001 (1941).
19. Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E.(2d) 560 (1948).
20. 78 App. D.C. 217, 139 F.(2d) 14, 158 A.L.R. 1370 (1943), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 790, 64 S.Ct. 790, 88 L.Ed. 1080 (1944).
21. 227 Minn. 194, 34 N.W. 695 (1948).
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Louisiana has also had occasion to consider the problem
presented in the present case. In Castay v. Katz and Besthof,22
the court of appeal held on facts similar to those in the principal
case that the negligence of the owner's agent, in leaving the
automobile unattended and with the motor running, was not
the "proximate cause" of plaintiff's injuries. No statutory viola-
tion was involved. In another court of appeal case, Maggiore v.
Laundry & Dry Cleaning Service,23 decided the same year, the
plaintiff was allowed recovery for injuries received in attempting
to push defendant's truck from in front of a driveway, where it
had been parked in violation of a city ordinance.
What the position of the Louisiana Supreme Court would be
in a case similar to Ostergard v. Frisch is not known. Yet, in
view of what appears to be a definite trend toward extending
the liability of an automobile owner for injuries caused by the
negligent operation of the automobile by third persons and in
view of the considerations of public policy behind this search for
a solvent defendant, it is expected that the precedent established
in Ostergard v. Frisch will gradually find a wide-spread accept-
ance in jurdisdictions other than Illinois.
WADE SMITH
22. 148 So. 76 (La. App. 1933).
23. 150 So. 394 (La. App. 1933).
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